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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SET-OFF.
Although the law, through frequent statements by its oracles,
may be said in theory at least, to be fairly committed to the prini-
ciple that circuity of action is undesirable, the history of set-off
and counter-claim displays how tedious, as well as devious, are
the processes that transmute counsels of perfection into rules of
conduct.
The curious analogy, so often noted in the development of
English and Roman procedure, is particularly striking in the
tardy acceptance by both systems of the common sense view
that a man should not be compelled to pay one moment what he
will be entitled to recover back the next. Compensatio is the
name given by the Roman law to the cancelling of cross de-
mands.' While there are many disputed points in the history of
the doctrine,2 it is clear that as late as the time of Gaius,3 the
golden age of the empire, it was limited in practice to claims
growing out of the same transaction (ex eadem causa), was not
permitted as of course in actions stricti juris, but belonged pri-
'Digest, XVI, 2, 1.
Sohm's Institutes (3d Ed.) 441; E. Stamnpe, Das Compensationsverfaren
im Vorjustinianischen Stricti Juris Judicinn; Dernberg, Geschichte und
Theorie der Compensation.
'Institutes of Gains, 4, Secs. 61-68.
(541)
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marily to praetorian actions bonae fidei. There the judex could
by virtue of the equitable nature of his commission set off, in
his discretion, a debt due by the plaintiff to the defendant grow-
ing out of the same affair as the plaintiff's claim. In the case
of the banker (argentarius) a stricter rule prevailed. He could
sue only for the balance of his account, at the peril of losing the
whole if overstated. So, too, the position of the purchaser of
an insolvent's estate (bonorum emptor) was exceptional. In
suing a debtor of the insolvent he was obliged to allow (deductio)
what was due from the insolvent to the defendant and between
the compensatio of the banker and this deductio there was this
difference, the former was confined to claims of the same nature
while the latter was not so limited nor was it confined to debts
then due.
In further development of the right, compensatio came to
be allowed in actions stricti juris when, and only when, an
exceptio doli was introduced into the formula based on this
ground, but the effect, it would appear, was at first too far-
reaching, since if the defendant succeeded in proving the counter-
claim the judex was bound to absolve him altogether. 4  The
rescript of Marcus Aurelius provided generally that an exceptio
doli on the ground of compensatio should thenceforth in actions
stricti juris, if made good, operate as an off-set pro tanto. And,
as actions stricti juris were based on unilateral obligations, it is
clear that thenceforth compensatio was permissible whether aris-
ing x dispari causa or ex eaden causa. Finally Justinian's Con-
stitution extended the doctrine so as to include "actions real,
personal or of any other kind with the single exception of the
action of deposit." '
A point of difficulty was the effect to be given to the words
"'actiones ipso jure minuant" in Justinian's legislation. If one
who was debtor to another became his creditor in a sum suscep-
tible of compensation, were the respective debts from thence-
forth extinguished by mere operation of law, or was some
further act necessary to accomplish this result, such as an agree-
'Girard (4th Ed.) 705; Salkowski's Roman Law, 703.
'Institutes IV, 6, 30. Code 4, 3, 14.
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ment by the parties or the judgment of a court? The answer to
this question has a practical bearing upon various problems con-
nected with set-off such as the Statute of Limitations, the run-
ning of interest and the appropriation of payments on open
account. While commentators differ, modern authority is not
inclined to regard the Roman texts as establishing the principle
of automatic legal extinction of the original claim, although con-
ceding that judicial compensation was, in its effect, to be re-
garded as relating back to the time when the two claims first co-
existed.6 But at one time the opposite view had strong support
and the powerful influence of Cujas caused it to prevail in
France - where, in the words of the present code, compensation
takes place of right by force of law even without the knowledge
of the debtors; the two debts are reciprocally extinguished from
the moment they exist at the same time, to the extent of the.
respective amounts thereof.8 The Court of Sessions of Scotland,
on the other hand, in 1738, in Maxwell v. Creditors of M'Cul-
loch,9 adopted the principle of judicial compensation, contrary to
the opinion of Lord Stair, thereby leaving it "optional to the
party to propone it or not" or, in case of more debts than one,
"to propone it upon one or the other debt." But when compensa-
tion was applied it was, upon equitable principles, given "an
operation retro to stop the course of annual rent."
Where the Roman law was not received, as in England and
in those parts of France where customary law prevailed, the
doctrine of compensation did not exist. It was introduced more
readily in some of the French jurisdictions than in England.
For example, set-off of liquidated debts was allowed at the
Chatelet of Paris in the fourteenth century.'0 On the other hand,
'Sohn Inst. (3d Ed.) 446. Moyles Note to Inst. IV, 6, 30.
'Brissand, Hist. French Private Law (Amer. Law. School Ed.) 558 note.
See also Pothier on Obligations III, 4, 3.
'French Civil Code, Art. i29. See Baudry-Lacantinerie (ioth Ed.),
Vol. 3, 362. Compare the German Civil Code which in article 388 provides
"Compensation takes place by notice to the other party. The notice is of nr.
effect, if it is given with a condition or a determination of time."
'5 Mor. 2550 (1738). The doctrine of compensation was not recognized
at first in Scotland, Queen v. Bishop of Aberdeen, 5 Mor. 2545 (1543), but
was introduced by the Act of 1592, Chap. 143. Erskine (25th Ed.) 514.
"' Brissand, 558 note.
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there were French districts that stubbornly adhered to the older
law; and in England, where customary law was doubly strong
as the law of the realm, resistance to a doctrine so foreign to the
spirit of a formalistic procedure was to be expected. Nor does it
require much imagination to understand why the principle made.
so little progress. The forms of action and the system of plead-
ing were designed to bring the opposing parties to one single and
certain issue, affirmed on the one side and denied on the other.
To inject a collateral question by which the case might be blown
off by a side wind, as- the phrase was, would have seemed in-
tolerable. Even as late as 1815 a court of last resort in one of
our states will be found declaring it "much better to leave the
parties to their mutual remedies than to introduce such a prin-
ciple and practice". 1 Nor, again, was it to be expected that
there would be any appreciable social pressure upon the law for a
modification of this view so long as the unilateral contract was
the dominant type of obligation, the form in which he who
thought about the law at all visualized his conception of a normal
contract. So it was in Rome while the Praetorian actions bonae
fidei gradually developed, so in England during the slow growth
of assumpsit. Commerce found in these neoteric remedies the
medium for translating its newly developed norms into principles
of substantive law while professedly adhering to traditional con-
cepts. Only when the significance of the bilateral obligation was
understood would the two-sidedness of mercantile relations be
felt with sufficient distinctness to form the basis for a juristic
departure, the practice of setting off divergent claims arising
out of the same transaction. And that principle accepted and its
convenience demonstrated, the next step should be its extension
to claims growing out of independent transactions.
At common law some of the more obvious instances of
mutual conflicting demands were redressed by means of the
existing procedure. Thus the action of account within its very
narrow limits provided such a remedy by means of the audit;12
'McLean v. McLean, i Conn. 697 (1815).
- Co. Litt. I72a, I Bac. Abr. Accompt. (A); i Comyn's Dig. Accompt.
(A) i; Thuron v. Paul, 6 Whart. 615 (Pa. 1844).
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a remedy supplemented by the bill in equity, for an account,
13
and the extension of assurnpsit into the field of account.14 There
was also recognized as early as the fourteenth century in certain
actions, especially the assize of novel disseisin, a right called
recoupment. But the term had a narrower signification than in
modern law, as will appear from an examination of the decisions,
many of which are collected in Coulter's Case '5 and Viner's
Abridgment. Thus, where W leased to G for life and after-
wards disseised G, who brought an assize of novel disseisin
against W, it was held that the rent accruing during the disseisin
should be recouped from the damages but not that which accrued
before the disseisin.'O The word seems to imply no more than a
right to have payments or other analogous facts shown in deduc-
tion or mitigation of damages as a means of arriving at actual
damages and not the broad principle applied in modern actions
of contract, where the defendant is permitted to recofip damages
from the plaintiff because he has not complied with some duty
or obligation imposed upon him by the terms of the contract
upon which he sues. 17  No trace of this latter doctrine is to be
found until about the beginning of the nineteenth century, when
it is first applied on grounds analogous to failure of considera-
tion,'s and the caution with which it was first accepted and slowly
" Langdell's Equity Jurisdiction 1O7; i Story's Equity Jurisprudence
(I3th Ed.), 443 et seq.
" Arris v. Stukely, 2 Mod. 260 (1678); Dale v. Sollet, 4 Burr, 2133
(1767) ; Tomkins v. Willshear, 5 Taunt. 431 (1814). Hence where the trans-
action necessarily constituted an account the balance only was considered the
debt. Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2221 (1768).
'5 Co. 30 (1598) ; Viner's Abridgment, Discount (A). See also note to
Incely v. Grew, 6 Nev. & M. 469 (1836).
"6 Y. B. 9 Edw. 1II, 8, pl. 21. See also 8 Ass. 20, pl. 37; 12 Ass. 35, pl.
20; Y. B. 24 Edw. III, 49, p1. 35; Y. B. 22 Edw. IV, 25; Dyer 2b; Fitzherbert
Abr., Damage, pl. 18; Brooke Abr., Damage, pl. 7; Whitehall v. Squire, Carth.
1O3 (i6go); Carey v. Guillow, 1O5 Mass. 18 (187o); Edgemoor I. Co. v.
Brown, 6 Pennyw. io (Del. 19o6).
"Farnsworth v. Garrard, i Camp. 38 (18o7); Basten v. Butter, 7 East
479 (i8o6) ; Heck v. Shener, 4 S. & R. 249 (Pa. 1818) ; McAllister v. Reab.
4 Wend. 483 (N. Y. 183o); Affirmed 8 Wend. IiO (1831); Epperley v. Bailey,
3 Ind. 72 (1852); Stow v. Yarwood, 14 Ill. 426 (853); Ward v. Fellers,
3 Mich. 281 (1854); Carey v. Guillow, lO5 Mass. 18 (i87o); Davenport v.
Hubbard, 46 Vt. 2oo (1873); Lawton v. Ricketts, 104 Ala. 435 (1893);
Edgemoor I. Co. v. Brown H. M. Co., 6 Pennyw. io (Del. i9o6).
'"See 9 AMFR. LAW. REG. 321 (i86i) ; 7 AMER. L. REV. 389 (1873)
Waterman on Set-Off, 465.
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extended shows how tenaciously the common lawyer will adhere
to a theory, in this case the theory of independent covenants, at
the expense of convenience.
Set-off, however, in the sense of cancelling mutual inde-
pendent cross-demands was apparently regarded as out of ques-
tion at law 19 when in 1677 it was said bluntly in Sir William
Darcy's Case:20
"That if A oweth B £ioo by recognizance, and B oweth A 150
or £io upon any security whatever, and A sues B, that B cannot
compel A to pay himself by way of retainer out of what is due
him, but they must take their mutual remedies, unless there were
any agreement to the contrary."
But the plain statement of a rule is often the first sign that it is
questioned and the time was at hand when the quoted dictum
would not be regarded as fundamental. There were several
contributing reasons. In the first place, when the tenure of
judicial office was made secure and a fixed salary took the place
of fees, the courts and their official staffs were no longer per-
sonally interested in a multiplicity of suits. Then, during the
troubled years of rebellion and revolution, the leading men of
both parties spent considerable time in exile, came in contact with
continental ideas and intellectually under the influence of that
school of jurists whose theories of natural justice were then
predominant, giving an impetus to the growth of equity, which
is the keynote of such law reform as was accomplished in the
eighteenth century. Again, with the expansion of commerce,
business relations became less localized, less intimate; credit
more widely extended and assets, unhappily, more easily hidden
from legal process. The solid trader, sued and compelled to pay
a customer in doubtful circumstances, without power to present
his own bill as an offset, could take little comfort in the thought
of his technical right to obtain a judgment that would probably
be barren of results. Equitable relief, legislation; both, in fact,
were inevitable.
"By the custom of London in foreign attachment one indebted to a
person whom he was suing could attach the debt in his own hands; Bohun
Privilegia Londoni (1723) 268; Hodges v. Cox, Cro. Eliz. 843 (i6oo).
"2 Freeman 28 (671).
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It was through bankruptcy proceedings that set-off first
obtained a foothold in English law. The temporary bankruptcy
act of 4 Anne, c. 17, sec. ii, provided that where there had been
"mutual credit" given between the bankrupt and any person who
was his debtor, the latter should not be compelled to pay more
than the balance that appeared due on an adjustment of the
account. This statute was followed by others making various
improvements in the law which are now embodied in the English
bankruptcy act of 1883 21 and the American act of 1898.22 But
equitable jurisdiction over set-offs in cases of bankruptcy was
exercised by the Court of Chancery long prior to the introduction
of the provision into the statute. In 1676, Lord Guildford, then
chief justice of the common pleas, is reported as saying:
"If there are accounts between two merchants, and one of them
become bankrupt, the course is not to make the other, who perhaps
upon stating the accounts is found indebted to the bankrupt, to pay
the whole that originally was entrusted to him, and to put him
for the recovery of what the bankrupt owes him, into the same con-
dition with the rest of the creditors; but to make him pay that
only which appears due to the bankrupt on the foot of the account;
otherwise it will be for accounts betwixt them after the time of
the other's becoming bankrupt, if any such were." 23
A similar statement is attributed to Lord Chief Justice iHale, in
Chapman v. Derby.24  In fact, there can be no doubt that such
was the practice of the commissioners of bankruptcy before any
statutory provisions on the subject appeared.
2 5
Conflicting opinions have been expressed as to the extent of
246 and 47 Vict. C. 52, 38.
'Act of Congress, July I, 1898, Chap. 541, 68. For the controversy
centering upon the distinction between "mutual credits" and "mutual debts"
see Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt 449 (1818) and the notes to that case in Smith's
Leading Cases. For modern views see Lister v. Hooson (igo8), i K. B. 174;
Lord v. Great Eastern Ry. (19o8), i K B. 195; In re A Debtor (igog), i
K. B. 43o; Walther v. Williams M. Co., 169 Fed. 270 (igog); In re Lesher
Co., 176 Fed. 650 (igio) ; In re Michaelis, 196 Fed. 718 (1912).
Anonymous, I Mod. 215 (1676). Note, however, Provincial Bill Post-
ing Co. v. Low Moor Iron Co. (19o9), 2 K. B. 344.
242 Vernon 117 (1689). In Garnett & M. G. M. Co. v. Sutton, 32 L. J.
Q. B. 47 (1862), Blackburn, J., states, in the course of argument, that Lord
Nottingham when chancellor made an order that an account be stated be-
tween the bankrupt and his debtors. The reporter states that he cannot find
any reported decision of Lord Nottingham to that effect.
Gibson v. Bell, I Bingh. N. C. 743 (1835) per Tindal, C. J. But com-
pare Lord Hardwicke's statement in Ex parte Prescott, i Atk. 230 (1753).
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Chancery's jurisdiction in matters of set-off independent of the
statutes. In Green v. Farmer,2 Lord Mansfield is reported as
saying: "Where there were mutual debts unconnected, the law
said they should not be set off; but each must sue. And courts
of equity followed the same rule because it was the law." On
the other hand, Vice Chancellor Turner, in Freeman v. Lomas,
27
regarded it as clear "that the rights of debtors and creditors, in
cases of cross-demands between them, as those rights subsisted
in equity, were not derived from or dependent upon any statutory
right of set-off." He thought it not improbable that the statutory
rights were founded on the equitable rule and was inclined in
agreement with Sir Thomas Clarke 28 to deduce the rule from
the Roman law. The cases, presently to be referred to, show
that Lord Mansfield was in error. But there was no direct
adoption of the civil law doctrine as such. On the contrary,
there is a material difference between the then prevailing con-
tinental view of compensation, which of right extinguished the
mutual debts, and set-off, which is a cross-demand within the
cofntrol of the defendant to use if he pleases or to be preserved
for a separate action .2  What seems probable is that the law on
becoming conscious of a situation that offended common sense,
or "natural justice" as it was then called, with its usual baffling
eclecticism, borrowed without credit from the foreign, and there-
fore presumptively outlandish, source the idea but not the form
of the doctrine and adapted it empirically to its own needs.
Among the early chancery cases, before either the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1706 or the Set-off Act of 1729, was Curson v.
African Co.30 before Lord Keeper North, in 1683, where the
plaintiff, when he had agreed to take a portion of his claim like
other creditors, was ordered to allow a debt owing by him to the
264 Burr. 2214 (1768), S. C. i W. BI. 651.
=9 Hare lO9 (1851).
'Whitaker v. Rush, Amb. 407 (1761). See also Duncan v. Lyon, 3
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 351 (1818).
"Evan's Pothier on Contracts. Appendix B. The civil law doctrine
prevails in Louisiana, Code Art. 2203. . Compare Putts v. Carpenter, i Wils
T9 (1743) ; Minor v. Walter, 17 Mass. 231 (1821) ; Green v. Darling, 5 Mason
2O (1828) ; Himes v. Barnitz, 8 Watts 39 (Pa. 1839).
30 1 Vern. 121 (1683).
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company, for, since it was the custom of companies to give
credit to those whom they owed, stoppage was to be allowed as a
good payment. So in Peters v. Soame,31 in 1701, on a bill by the
assignee of a bond where the obligee had become bankrupt and
the bond was claimed by the assignees in bankruptcy while the
obligor claimed that the obligee was in debt to him, Lord Keeper
Wright, though in doubt, thought "that stoppage seemed to be a
good equity in such case." In Downham v. Matthews,3 2 A, a
clothier, and B, a dyer, had mutual -dealings in the way of their
trade which were carried on for several years without payment of
money on either side. B died intestate and indebted to others
by specialties who took out administration and sued A at law,
who then brought a bill to be relieved. Lord Macclesfield de-
creed an account and that A should be allowed on discount what
was due from B. He said that though generally stoppage was
no payment, yet in cases of this nature where it appeared that
the mutual dealings had been carried on for several years there
was a strong presumption of an agreement to that purpose, and
that it was the constant use among merchants and traders. Two
years later, Sir Joseph Jekyll, master of the rolls, is reported as
saying:
"It is true, stoppage is no payment at law, nor is it, of itself,
payment in equity, but then a very slender agreement for discount-
ing or allowing one debt out of the other, will make it a payment,
because this prevents circuity of action and multiplicity of suits,
which is not favored in law, much less in equity." 33
In these early cases the practice is described as stoppage, because
the debtor is in equity allowed to hold back or deduct from the
demand against him the amount of his own claim, and it is curious
to note that, almost contemporaneously, chancery was developing
another equitable doctrine of the same name, stoppage in transitu,
by which the vendor could rescue from the carrier goods on their
way to a vendee who had become bankrupt.34 Stoppage of goods
=2 Vern. 428 (17O).
'Prec. Ch. 58o (1721), S. C. 2 Eq. Ca. Abr., 9, pl. 8.
' Jeffs v. Wood, 2 P. Wins. 128 (723), S. C. 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. IO, pl. 9.
See also Hawkins v. Freeman, 8 Vin. Abr. 56o (1724) ; Berriste v. Berriste,
Nelson 157 (169o); Lanesborough v. Jones, i P. Wms. 325 (1716).
'Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 2 Vern. 203 (i6go); Suee v. Prescott, i Atk.
245 (1743); D'Aquilia v. Lambert, Amb. 399n (i'61); 2 Kent's Comm. 542.
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in transit has become a legal right of great importance; stoppage
of debts has changed its name, fortunately indeed, for our legal
vocabulary is too constricted as it is.
It is unnecessary to trace further the line of equity cases
that followed the enactment of the statutes of set-off. They are
discussed at length by Mr. Justice Story, in Green v. Darling,35
who concludes:
"Since the statutes of set-off of mutual debts and credits,
courts of equity have generally followed the course adopted in
the construction of the statutes by courts of law; and have applied
the doctrine to equitable debts; they have rarely, if ever, broken in
upon the decisions at law, unless some other equity intervened,
which justified them in granting relief beyond the rules of -law,
such as has been already alluded to. And on the other hand courts
of law sometimes set off equitable against legal debts, as in Bot-
tomley v. Brooke (i Term R. 619). The American courts have
generally adopted the same principles, as far as the statutes of set
off of the respective states have enabled them to act."
This is a just estimate of the authorities 31 but it is, as well, one
of many illustrations that might be given of the timid attitude
characteristic of equity jurisprudence in the last years of the
eighteenth and the early years of the ninteenth century. Chan-
cery for a time drew back, frightened at its own growth. In
recent years it has recovered sufficiently to administer its system
of remedial justice on broader principles. "Equity," says Mr.
Chief Justice Baldwin, "recognizes rights of set-off which go
far beyond those which the early legislation of England and Con-
necticut introduced in actions at common law."'37
'5 Mason 201 (1828). The early cases are also well reviewed in Tus-
cumbia & R. C. v. Rhodes, 8 Ala. 206 (1845).
Ex parte Stevens, Ii Ves. 24 (1805); Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402
(N. Y. 1831); Rawson v. Samuel, Craig & P. I6I (1839); Jennings v.
Webster, 8 Paige503 (N. Y. 184o); Van Wagoner v. Patterson G. L. Co.,
23 N. J. Eq. 283(1852); Spear v. Day, 5 Wis. 193 (1856); Smith v. Felton,
43 N. Y. 419 (1871); Clarke v. Hawkins, 5 R. I. 219 (1858); Lockwood v.
Beckwith, 6 Mich. 168 (1858) ; Spaulding v. Boardman, 122 Mass. 553 (1876) ;
Mechanics Bank v. Stone, 115 Mich. 648 (1898); Fitzgerald v. Wiley, 22
App. D. C. 329 (19o3); Motion Picture Co. v. Eclair Co., 208 Fed. 416 (1913).
"Hubley M. & S. Co. v. Ives, 81 Conn. 244 (1908), S. C. 7o Atl. 615.
See also Crummett v. Littlefield, 98 Me. 317 (19o3) ; Porter v. Riseman, 165
Ind. 255 (9o5) ; Pruity v. Cahill, 235 Ill. 534 (19o8) ; Craighead v. Swartz,
219 Pa. 149 (I9O7) ; Protrowski v. Czerwinski, 138 Wis. 396 (igog); Perry
v. Page, 215 Mass. 403 (1913) ; Cromwell v. Parsons, 219 Mass. 299 (1914).
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Although familiar enough as a commonplace of practice, it
may be interesting to look back at the early legislation which has
influenced the attitude of the courts towards cross-demands more
profoundly than the very limited scope of the statutes would have
led their authors to expect. In the enactment of such statutes
several of the American colonies were many years in advance of
the mother country; but it will be more convenient, perhaps, first
to consider the English Act of 1729,38 which was adopted in
substance in many of the United States and, even in those where
it never was in force, has affected legal opinion indirectly through
the English cases that interpreted its brief words. The act, which
was temporary, and primarily directed to the reform of debtors'
prisons and the relief through insolvency proceedings of dis-
tressed debtors, contained this clause:
"Where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and de-
fendant, or if either party sue or be sued as executor or adminis-
trator, where there are mutual debts between the testator or intestate
and either party, one debt may be set against the other, and such
matter may be given in evidence upon the general issue, or pleaded
in bar, as the nature of the case shall require, so as at the time of
his pleading the general issue, where any such debt of the plaintiff,
his testator or intestate, is intended to be insisted on in evidence,
notice shall be given of the particular sum or debt so intended to be
insisted on, and upon what account it became due, or otherwise
such matters shall not be allowed in evidence upon such general
issue."
It is significant that this modification of the law was intro-
duced through the medium of an insolvency act, for the settle-
ment of an insolvent's estate presents problems closely akin to
those of bankruptcy. The statute does not, however, stop with
insolvency, but provides generally for the set-off of debts in
courts of law, referring particularly to suits brought after the
death of one of the parties. So also, it permits the then new-
fangled practice of pleading the general issue and giving the
evidence under notice of special matter.39 On the other hand,
a 2 Geo. II, Chap. 22, Sec. 13. 1
'Gower v. Hunt, Barne's Notes 291 (1735), S. C. Bull. N. P. I77; 1
Tidd. Pr. (9th Ed.) 662; this has continued to be the practice in some states
although, generally, set-off is specially pleaded. ig Enc. Pl. & Pr. 739.
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the act is restricted to "mutual debts" while the bankruptcy acts
included "mutual credits," thereby giving rise to a controversy
no longer important. 40  It was doubted whether mutual debts of
a different nature could be set off ;41 hence when this clause of
the Act of 1729 was made perpetual in 1735,42 it was expressly
enacted that mutual debts should be set off "notwithstanding that
such debts are deemed in law to be of a different nature." Once
these statutes were adopted the court extended the remedy some-
what beyond their letter. Thus at the outset of an action they
would not permit a plaintiff in his affidavit to hold to bail to
swear to one side only of an account; an arrest, made without
giving credit for items clearly due, was held without probable
cause and actionable. 43  So also, a judgment in one action was
set off against a judgment in another action ;44 and, where parties
had mutual demands for costs against each other, the court on
motion would order them to be set off.45 Nevertheless the prac-
tice was confined within narrow bounds, as is well summarized
by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in Stoke v. Taylor,46 as follows:
"See supra, note 22. The insolvency act of 32 Geo. II, Chap. 28, Sec.
23 (The Lords' Act), provided that where mutual credit had been given
between a prisoner and another the assignees for creditors could demand the
balance only.
' Kemys v. Betson, 8 Vin. Abr. 56I (733); Stephens v. Lofty, 2 Bar-
nard 339 (I733) ; Hutchenson ir. Sturges, Willes 261 (I74i).
'8 Geo. II, Chap. 24, Sec. 5. There was a proviso that if either of the
debts accrued by reason of a penalty in a bond the debt should be pleaded
in bar. The day after the Act of 1735 passed, Lord Hardwicke, C. J., said
that a debt by simple contract might by the former act have been set off
against a specialty. Brown v. Holyoak, Bull. N. P. 175 (1735).
I1 Sellon's Pr. (1798) 322; Dronefield v. Archer, 5 B. & Ald. 513 (1822);
Austin v. Debram, 3 B. & C. 139 (1824), disapproving Brown v. Pidgeon, 2
Camp. 594 (18ix).
"Barker v. Braham, 2 W. BI. 869 (i773), S. C. 3 Wils. 396; Mitchell v.
Oldfield, 4 Term, R. 123 (i7gI); Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Term. R. 69 (1798);
Bremerton v. Harris, i Johns. I44 (N. Y. i8o6); Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7
Mass. i4o (18io) ; Burns v. Thornburgh, 3 Watts 78 (Pa. 1834) ; Brown v.
Hendrickson, 39 N. J. L. 239 (1877); Ehrhart v. Esbenshade, 53 Pa. Super.
Ct. 258 (1913).
'Nunez v. Modigliani, i H. Bl. 217 (780) ; Howell v. Harding, 8 East
362 (1807).
"(i88o) 5 Q. B. D. 569, at p. 575. See also Rawley v. Rawley (1876),
T Q. B. D. 46o; Brazelton v. Nashville & C. R. Co., 3 Head 570 (Tenn. 1859) ;
B. & 0. R. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1878). As will be shown, some
of the American statutes were broader in scope. See 34 Cyc. 76o. As to
unliquidated demands see 34 Cyc. 654, 693.
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"By the statutes of set off this plea is available only where the
claims on both sides are in respect of liquidatea debts, or money
demands which can be readily and without difficulty ascertained.
The plea can only be used in the way of defence to the plaintiff's
action, as a shield, not as a sword. Though the defendant suc-
ceeded in proving a debt exceeding the plaintiff's demand, he was
not entitled to recover the excess; the effect was only to defeat the
plaintiff's action, the same as though the debt proved had been
equal to the amount of the claim established by the plaintiff and
no more."
To which it may be added that there could be no set-off, unless
both debts were due 47 and held in the same right. Strict mutual-
ity was requisite and, where it did not exist, a technical set-off
was impossible.
48
Turning now to the American colonies, it is surprising to
find Virginia enacting a statute of set-off eighty-four years before
the mother country. The Act of I645,'4 apparently the first of
its kind, is as follows:
"Be it enacted by the authoritie of this present Grand As-
sembly for avoiding causes and suits at law, that where any suit
shall be commenced in quarter court or county court, that if the
defendant have either bill, bond or accompt of the plt. wherein
he proves him debtor, that in such cases the courts do balance accs.
consideration being had and allowance given to the plt. for his
charges who first began his suit, as alsoe to the time when such
bills, bonds, accompts or demands were due to be compared with
the aces. in balance, and this act to continue until the next as-
sembly"
The act was made perpetual at the session of I646,30 and
was included, with some slight changes, in the general revisions
of the statutes that were made at the sessions of 1658 " and
"Richards v. James, 6 D. & L. 52 (1848) ; Cobb v. Curtiss, 8 Johns 470
(N. Y. 1811); Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. 54r (1881). Compare in bankruptcy
Ex parte Prescott, i Atk. 230 (1753); Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350
(9o).
"Isberg v. Bowden, 8 Exch. 852 (1853) ; Watkins v. Zane, 4 Md., Chap.
13 (847); Ryan v. Barger, 16 Ill. 28 ('854); Bentz v. Bentz, 95 Pa. 216
(i88o).
"February 17, 1644-5, I Hening's Laws 294. The quarter court was that
of the Governor and council.
March, 1645-6, I Hening's Laws 314.
" March 13, 1657-8, I Hening's Laws 449.
554 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
i 66z, 52 but would seem to have been supplied by the Act of
17o5,3 which gave the defendant, in an .action for any debt, "the
liberty upon trial thereof to make all the discount he can against
such debt." This act appeared in the collection of laws of I769,
54
but was omitted from subsequent revisions and, doubts having
arisen as to whether there was any law in force regulating dis-
counts and offsets, a declaratory act was passed in i8o6,5 5 sub-
stantially re-enacting the law of 1705.
Such, in brief, is the story of this innovation. But who was
the originator? Was it the result of a personal grievance, or a
bold venture upon the herculean task of law reform? The facts
may be hidden in the archives or correspondence of the time, but
the statute book does not tell us. We know little of the pedigree
of more famous statutes. It may be worth noting, however, that
the assembly which passed the Act of 1645 met in disturbed
times. The Civil War was raging in England-it was the year
of Naseby; Governor Berkeley had returned to England; and
sitting in the council were noted roundheads, including Richard
Bennett and William Claiborne, the party leaders, appointed in
1651 commissioners "for the reducing of Virginia and the in-
habitants thereof to their due obedience to the Commonwealth of
England.""' It is also somewhat significant that when Bennett
and Claiborne overthrew the proprietary government of Mary-
land in 1654, there was included among the acts passed by the
Assembly held at Patuxent that year an act for discounting
debts.57  This much is clear: the unsettled political conditions
March, 1662, 2 Hening's Laws i1o.
'October, 17o5 (4 Anne), 3 Hening's Laws 378.
22 Geo. II, Chap. 27, par. 6, p. 249.
Dec. 29, i8o6 (Collection of i8o8, p. 117). This act remained in force
until the revision of 1849. Allen v. Hart, 18 Gratt. %2 (Va. i868); Wartman
v. Yost, 2 Gratt. 549 (Va. 1872); B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va.
833 (1878).
"Maryland Under the Commonwealth," by B. C. Steiner, JoHlNs Hop-
KINS UNIV. STUD., Vol. 29, P. 53.
'Act of Oct. 2o, 1654, Chap. 23, I Md. Arch. (Asso.) 346. The words
of the act are as follows: "All lawful accompts produced and proved in
court the defendants part shall hold play to the plfts. suit for debt. And
shall be satisfactory to his demands, except the said account be above nine
months' standing." For subsequent legislation see note to Strike's Case,
I Bland., Chan. 79 (817).
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offered an unusual opportunity for the unobstructed enactment
of legislation of bourgeois interest, and it is highly probable that
some member or members of the popular party who, as lay jus-
tices perhaps, had been confronted with this very problem, carried
the act as a measure of practical reform in an assembly hostile to
lawyers and lawyers' ways. Indeed, it was this assembly that
passed the famous act prohibiting attorneys from practicing in
the courts for money, for the reason that suits had been multiplied
by the "unskilfullness and covetousness of attorneys." 58 More
cannot be .said. Such legislation was not part of the conscious
programme of the American Puritan whose principal concern
was the theocratic state. In England the common law bar was
"the soul of the rebellion." But, on comparing the great con-
stitutional and institutional reforms with the meagre improve-
ments in private law under the commonwealth, one is convinced
that the Puritan lawyer had the faults and virtues common to the
legal profession-today as well as yesterday-a genuine love for
politics and public life coupled with a decided distaste for sys-
tematic jurisprudence. 59
Coming now to Pennsylvania and remembering the ad-
vanced views held by William Penn upon the subject of law
reform, it is not surprising to find among the laws proposed by
the proprietor and adopted at the first assembly held at Chester,
December r, 1682, an act providing:
"That for avoiding numerous suits, if two men dealing to-
gether, be indebted to each other, upon bonds, bills, bargains or the
like, provided they be of equal clearness and truth, the defendant
shall in his answer acknowledge the debt which the plaintiff de-
mandeth, and defaulk what the plaintiff oweth to him upon like
clearness." 80
The-exceptional features of this statute are, first, the adop-
i 1 Hening's Laws 302. See "Justice in Colonial Virginia," by 0. P.
Chitwood, JoiaNs HOPKINS UNIV. STUD., Vol. 23, p. i6.
Robinson's Anticipations under the Commonwealth of Changes in the
Law, i Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 467. So in the
United States, constitutional and public law have engrossed the ablest legal
minds to the exclusion of private law.
"Charter and Laws of Penna., 118.
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tion of the old law Latin word defalcatio,6 1 thereby adding
another appellation to this over-named branch of procedure, and,
second and more important, that it is not limited to technical
debts and, although somewhat indefinite, is admittedly more com-
prehensive than the subsequent English acts.62 The ready accept-
ance of this act may have been due partially to the fact that
several of the assemblymen had long served as justices of the
local courts under the former government of the Duke of York
and were familiar with the problem. In the minutes of the early
courts, there are cases where mutual accounts were set off against
each other, although whether this was by consent 63 or in the
exercise of undefined equitable power is not always to be gathered
from the minutes." In at least one case where the plaintiff re-
fused to allow a deduction, the court gave judgment for the
plaintiff leaving the defendant's claim open to action. 6" The soil
was favorable for juridical experiments; the traditions of the
Dutch were of the civil law, while the pietism and practical
shrewdness of the Quakers combined to produce an attitude of
hostility to contentiousness. Some of these experiments failed,
such as the provision for official peacemakers, but the defalcation
act after some vicissitudes took root. With the other colonial
laws it was abrogated when the province was seized by William
and Mary in 1693,66 but was among the laws temporarily con-
tinued in force by Governor Fletcher. After Penn's restoration
it was substantially re-enacted in 1700,67 but a slight change in
the wording caused its downfall. The new act provided that the
debts to be defalked must be of "like dignity and clearness."
' Brackenridge's Law Miscellanies 186. The word is used by Fleta, Lib.
2, Chap. 57, par. II.
Sparks v. Garrigues, i Binn. 151 (Pa. i8o6); Steigleman v. Jeffries,
i S. & R. 471 (Pa. 1815) ; Gogel v. Jacoby, 5 S. & R. H17 (Pa. 1819); Ell-
maker v. Franklin F. I. Co., 6 W. & S. 439 (Pa. 1843).
IAs is clearly the case in Linsey v. Johnson, Upland Court Records 84
(1678).
"See Records of the Court of New Castle, pp. I5, 153, 422, 445, 473,
486, 494- See also Records of the Courts of Chester County, p. 17.
'Test v. Laersen, Upland Court Records 68 (1677).
' Charter and Laws of Penna., 220, 547.
62 Stat. at Large Penna. 45.
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When the laws were transmitted to Queen Anne for approval,
Northey, the attorney general, reported: "This is a good law,
but it had been better if the setting off of debts on stating ac-
counts, had been general, and not restrained to the setting off of
debts against others of like dignity only. ' 16  The act was there-
fore rejected by the queen in council.
Upon the disapproval of the Act of 1700 the assembly
passed the Act of January 12, I7o5-6,"' which was allowed to
become a law by the queen's advisers. While preserving some
of the words of the first act, it is much more elaborate and con-
tains a new and ingenious clause providing that if it appear that
the plaintiff is overpaid, then the jury shall give their verdict for
the defendant and certify to the court the amount the plaintiff
is indebted to the defendant, which shall be recorded with the
verdict and become a debt of record. This provision for affirm-
ative relief to the defendant for the excess of his claim over the
plaintiff's demand was unknown in recoupment, 70 nor does it
appear in the earlier Virginia or later English acts. There is
some resemblance to the reconvention of the canon law by which
the defendant was permitted to introduce a counter demand into
the litigation which proceeded simultaneously with the original
demand, the parent of the cross-bill in equity." It is not impos-
sible that the basic idea of the certificate of set-off may have been
suggested from this course. On the other hand, there is nothing
to show that the thought was not original, the product of a happy
flash of common sense on the part of the draughtsman of the act,
an inference supported by the fact that the award is not called a
judgment, but a debt of record, upon which the defendant must
62 Stat. at Large Penna. 493.
012 Stat. at Large Penna. 241; 2 P. & L. Dig. (2d Ed.) 2844. See 2 Pa.
Colonial Records, 214, 220, 239.
"Lufburn v. Henderson, 3o Ga. 482 (I86o); Waterman v. Clark, 76 Ill.
428 (875) ; B. & 0. R. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1878) ; Union Bank
v. Blanchard, 65 N. H. 21 (1888).
Decret. Greg. L. II, tit. x, Chap. 2; Decret. Greg. L. II, tit. iv, Chap. i;
Conset's Practice of the Spiritual Courts 339; Guilbert's Forum Romanorum
45; Story, Equity Pleadings, par. 402; Lanusse v. Pimpienella, 4 Martin N.
S. 439 (La. 1826); Walcott v. Hendrick, 6 Tex. 4o6 (1851); Duncan v.
Magette, 25 Tex. 245 (I86O); Suberville v. Adams, 47 La. Ann. 68 (1895).
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proceed by scire facias, a favorite writ in this colony where it
was put to uses unknown to the common law. At any rate, the
fufidamental soundness of the act, in spite of its verbosity and
lack of precision, is confirmed by its subsequent history. A
defendant obtaining a certificate is now entitled to judgment and
execution without scire facias,72 but otherwise the law remains
unichanged and is still in force. It is true that the Insolvency Act
of February 14, I729-3o,' 3 contained a clause copied almost
verbatim from the statute of 2 Geo. II, but the two acts were
construed in pari materia and the second was repealed upon a
revision of the insolvency laws in I814. 4
In 1714 New York enacted a statute which must have been
derived from the Pennsylvania act, for the language is nearly
identical. As printed below," 5 with the words and clauses brack-
eted that vary from the Pennsylvania act, it will be seen that the
only material differences are the substitution of the term "dis-
count" for "defaulk" and the requirement that written notice be
given with the plea, of the special matter intended to be relied on
'By an amendment of April ii, 1848, P. L. 536, Sec. I2, 2 P. & L. Dig.
(2d Ed.) 2850.
74 Stat. at Large Pa. 17, par. 7; 1 Smith's Laws of Pa. 181, Sec. io,
see Primer v. Kuhn, i Dall. 452 (1789).
"' March26, 1814, Smith's Laws of Pa. 202. And see Sec. 23 of the Act
of June 13, 1836, P. L. 729, 2 P. & L. Dig. (2d Ed.) 4012. The Practice Act
of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483, Sec. 14, provides that in assumpsit (which in Pa.
includes debt and covenant) a defendant may set off or set up by way of
counter-claim against the claims of the plaintiff any right or claim for
which an action of assumpsit would lie. See article by David Werner
Amram, Esq, in 64 UNIv. oF PENNA. L. REV. 257. As to set-off in justices'
courts see Sec. 7 of the Act of March 28, i8Io, 5 Sm. L. I6I, 2 P. & L. Dig.
(2d Ed.) 4349.
" "Be it enacted, etc., That if [any] two or more dealing together be
indebted to each other upon bonds, bills, bargains, promises, accounts, or the
like and one of them commence an action in any court of this [colony], if
the defendant cannot gainsay the deed, bargain or assumption upon which
he is sued it shall be lawful for such defendant to plead payment of all or
[any] part of the debt or sum demanded, [giving notice in writing, with the
said plea, of what he will insist upon at the trial for his discharge] and give
any bond, bill, receipt account or bargain [so given notice of] in evidence,
and if it shall [happen] that the defendant hath fully paid or satisfied the
debt or sum demanded, the jury shall find for the defendant and judgment
shall be entered that the plaintiff shall take nothing liy his writ and shall
pay the costs. And if it shall appear that any part of the sum demanded is
paid, then so much as is found to be paid shall be [discounted] and the
plaintiff shall have judgment for the residue only, with costs ofi suit. But
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as an off-set. The latter provision corrected a grave defect in
the earlier act and anticipated the similar provision in the English
act. In Pennsylvania, the omission was supplied by. the Act of
1729-3o and later by rule of court.7 6  New York, however, in
this respect differing from its neighbor, was not content with the
form of the statute, but improved it in a subsequent revision of
the laws relating to practice. 77  It is also significant that the
assembly, in 1768, referring to the burdening of jurors which is
"greatly increased since the law made for permitting discounts in
support of the plea of payment," passed an act for the com-
pulsory reference of cases involving long accounts.7T  Curiously
enough, New York was the one colony where the ground was
prepared for the reception of set-off, as the Dutch settlers were
familiar with corresponding civil law practice. There are
numerous cases in the records of the court of New Amsterdam,
involving such questions, one of which will suffice as an
illustration:
"Matewis Vos, pltf. vs. Adriaen Keyser, deft. (Mar. io, 1653,
City Hall.) Pltf. as curator of the estate of Andrees Johan Crist-
man demands from the deft. payment of 27 fl. 13st. book debts.
Deft. admits having received the goods except a quart measure, a
pint measure and a pair of snuffers amounting to 7 fl- 13 st. and
makes a counter-claim of 13 fi. 12 St. for silver and gold galoon de-
livered to said Christman decd. May 8, 1652, so he owes only 6 fl.
8 st. He declares this to be true and offers to swear to it. Pltf.
if it appear to the jury that the plaintiff is overpaid, then they shall give in
their verdict for the defendant, and withal certify to the court how much
they find the plaintiff to be indebted or in arrear to the defendant more than
will answer the debt or sum demanded, and the sum or sums so certified
shall be recorded with the verdict, and shall be deemed as a debt of record,
and if the plaintiff refuse to pay the same the defendant for recovery thereof
shall have a scire facias against the plaintiff in the said action and have
execution for the same, with costs of that action, any law, usage [or custom]
to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding." Act of 1714, Bradford's Laws
(726), p. 93.
"Troubat & Haly's Practice (1825) 134.
"Act of April 5, I813, par. i, i Laws of N. Y. (Van Ness & Wood-
worth) 515. For the history of the New York legislation see Steck v.
Colorado Fuel Co., i42 N. Y. 236 (i894).
"Act of Dec. 31, r768, Chap. 1363; Colonial Laws of N. Y., Vol. IV, p.
io4o; Luther v. Walton, i Caines Rep. 149 (N. Y. 1803); Adams v. Bayles,
2 Johns. 374 (N. Y. 1807) ; Act of April 5, 1813, Sec. 2, Laws of N. Y.
(Van Ness & Woodworth) 516; Snell v. Niagara Paper Mills, 193 N. Y.
432 (19o8).
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requests, that whereas the estate is insolvent, deft. must come in
with the other creditors. Burgomasters and schepans decide that
deft. may deduct from the demanded sum his counter-claim and
the things not received." 7
But upon the conquest by the English this practice does not seem
to have been continued under the Duke of York's laws, which
were derived principally from New England.
New Jersey, too, was among the colonies that adopted the
practice prior to the English statute. The act was among those
passed by the general assembly at Perth Amboy, May 5, 1722,80
and recited in the preamble that many vexatious suits had been
brought by troublesome and litigious persons when upon a just
balance of accounts there has been nothing due and the defendant
had no remedy but by cross action. The text follows closely the
language of the New York Act of 1714, but expressly includes
justices' courts and also requires that the defendant shall plead
his set-off "or else forever after be barred of bringing any action
for that which he might or ought to have pleaded by virtue of this
act." This is an unusually stringent rule. Under the act of 2
Geo. II, and in most of the American states, set-off is optional,
not compulsory.8 ' The obvious spirit and policy of the New
Jersey statute was not only to encourage, but to enforce the ad-
justment of such demands in one action. 2 There are indications
of an abnormal lack of sympathy for one of the supposed in-
i Records of New Amsterdam 63. See other cases in the same volume,
pp. IO5, 1O8, 114, 120, 138, 162. The word counter-claim is the translator's
rendering of the Dutch.
s Laws of New Jersey (Ed. of 1752), p. 98; Allinson's Laws of
N. J. (1776), p. 66. The act was revised but not substantially changed No-
vember 1, 1797 (R. S. 8oi). For a history of subsequent revisions see Godkin
v. Bailey, 74 N. J. L. 655 (1906); 4 Comp. Stat. N. J. (igo) 4836. The
Practice Act of 1912 provides: "Subject to rules, the defendant may counter-
claim or set off any cause of action."
" Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143 (1813), at p. 148; Morton v. Bailey,
2 Ill. 213 (1835) ; Minor v. Walter, 17 Mass. 237 (1821) ; Himes v. Barnitz,
8 Watts 39 (Pa. 1839); Broughton v. McIntosh, I Ala. lO3 (184o); contra,
Turk v. Shein, 55 W. Va. 466 (19o4). In several jurisdictions the rule is
different in justices' courts. Douglas v. Hoag, 1 Johns. 233 (N. Y. i8o6);
Welch v. Hazelton, 14 How. Pr. 97 (N. Y. 1857) ; Herring v. Adams, 5 W. &
S. 459 (Pa. 1843); Waterman on Set-Off, See. 574.
Schenk v. Schenk, io N. J. L. 276 (1829); Henry v. Milham, 13 N.
J. L. 266 (1832). Compare Sec. 12 of the Practice Act of 1912.
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alienable rights of a free man-the right to waste an unlimited
amount of public time.
It is unnecessary to trace the history of other legislation that
followed the enactment of the statutes of George 11.83 The most
interesting of the later acts are those of Massachusetts. In that
province a brief law of 1730-31 authorized a person sued in debt
"due by book" to plead "what is due upon his book by way of
balance." Doubts having arisen upon this act, an explanatory act
was passed in I732-33,s4 which provided that a person sued in
debt or case "for any sum of money due upon contract between
the parties for any goods sold, or service done, whether the ac-
count be open or a balance thereof be made and signed by the par-
ties (except specialties and express contracts in writing)" might
plead specially or upon the general issue give in evidence "what is
due upon his book by way of balance to the plaintiff's demand."
This law cannot have been generally observed, for in 1742-43
the general court passed a new act in nearly the same terms which
recited in the preamble that it was the "common practice to give
judgment without admitting any account in favour of the de-
fendant. '8 5 The statutes of 1784 and 1793 86 followed substan-
tially the provincial statutes, and as Chief Justice Shaw points out
in Stowers v. Barnard,"' "the consequence is that whilst demands
for unliquidated damages may be proved in set-off, the highest
classes of debts cannot be so proved." The learned Chief Justice
I Delaware, at first united to Pennsylvania, passed an act in 1739 which
also repealed the earlier act. Laws of Delaware (1797), p. 162. South
Carolina in 1733 passed an act allowing, discounts on behalf of decedents'
estates, 3 Stat. at Large 342, which was made general in 1744. 3 Stat. at
Large 6iI, 792. The North Carolina Act of 1756 is similar to the English
Act. N. Car. Laws (182), p. 197. So also, the New Hampshire Act of
1765, Prov. Stat. N. H. (177), p. 195. See further Chandler v. Drew, 6
N. H. 469 (1834); Martin v. Trowbridge, i Vt. 481 (1829); Greene v..
Darling, 5 Mason 201 (1828, Rhode Island); Meriwether v. Bird, 9 Ga.
59 (851). In Connecticut the first statute on set-off was passed in 1820.
Meeker v. Thompson, 43 Conn. 7"7 (1875).
'"Charter & Laws of Massachusetts Bay (1742), p. 291. There was a
further provision for the setting off of mutual executions.
8Temporary Acts of Massachusetts Bay (1755), p. 30. This act was
limited to seven years but was revived and continued.
'Oct. 30, 1784, Sec. 1:2, i Gen. Laws (1823), p. 169; Feb. 27, 1793, Sec. 4,
i Gen. Laws (1823), p. 451.
W32 Mass. 221 (1834).
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suggests that this may be accounted for on the hypothesis that,
when the provincial acts were passed, it was understood that the
English statutes, then recently enacted, would be extended to the
province without re-enactment and that the provincial statutes
were intended to complete the system. If such was the under-
standing it was a mistaken one and the anomaly has long since
been remedied.""
It would be interesting to know whether an impetus was
given to the English legislation by the prior colonial acts or
whether the legislation on both sides of the Atlantic was the out-
growth of a common feeling of impatience with a practice that
no longer appeared rational. But the point is not important.
Two distinct motives may be detected; one based on the idea
that an injustice is done the defendant in refusing him this
privilege, the other that unnecessary lawsuits are a nuisance.
The predominance of the latter notion leads to enactments favor-
ing affirmative relief for the defendant; the predominance of the
former to purely defensive statutes. But in the minor details of
practice, the prevalent use of the common stock of precedents,
tends to develop a certain rough uniformity in the law, not too
insistent on the basic legislation, with occasional divergences due
usually to some refractory phrase in the local act.
By the first quarter of the nineteenth century it may be said
that through statutes, and in some instances the liberal construc-
tion of such statutes, the principle has developed to this extent;
the right to plead and prove a counter demand, growing out of an
independent transaction for which an action might be maintained
by the defendant, as an offset to defeat the plaintiff's recovery in
whole or part, is generally recognized, and, in some states, an
affirmative judgment for the defendant is permitted. Under all
the statutes liquidated demands can be set off and, very generally,
the right is restricted to such demands. Some statutes are so con-
strued as to allow unliquidated claims arising out of contract to
be set off, but upon this subject there is regrettable confusion, de-
pending as the cases do, partly on the interpretation of the respec-
"Rev. Stat. 96, Secs. 1-5, Rev. Laws Mass. (19o2), Chap. 174, Vol. 2,
p. 1572.
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tive acts and partly ol the policy of the courts in enlarging or
restricting the right.89 Limited by statute to actions upon debts
and contracts, the almost universal rule is not to permit set-offs
in tort actions,90 and, in a similar manner, in contract actions to
disallow set-offs arising out of torts.9 1 Recoupment, on the
other hand, although frequently confused with set-off, is recog-
nized as a distinct principle, namely, the right to present in oppo-
sition to the plaintiff's claim, for its reduction or extinguishment,
a right of action in the defendant for loss or damage sustained
by him in the same transaction through breach of contract or duty
on the part of the plaintiff.
92
Such is a rough composite picture of the present state of the
law of set-off in many jurisdictions, representing the maximum
development so far attained. Further progress will depend upon
other considerations. Devised in aid of the common law and
adapted to its unreformed procedure, its rigid actions, artificial
pleadings, and theory of a single issue, minor advantages only
can be obtained from efforts to make set-off more flexible, before
the procedure itself is recast upon simpler lines.
The upheaval, which about the middle of the nineteenth
century led to adoption of code pleading in so many of the states,
introduced a new practice in this branch of law and a new term
to describe it-counter-claim. Not in the original New York
Code of I849,9 3 it first appeared in the amendments of i852,'
See generally the cases collected in the notes to 24 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
of Law (2d Ed.), 5o5, and 34 Cyc. 693 et seq.; Hunt v. Gilmore, 59 Pa. 450
(1868) ; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. 319 (77).
" Talbot v. Whipple, 73 Mass. 122 (1856); Collins v. Groseclose, 4o Ind.
414 (1872); Marlowe v. Rogers, io2 Ala. 510 (1893); Goldberger v. Leibo-
witz, 44 Colo. 99 (19o8) ; Wagner v. Prettyman, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 316 (1913).
"t Edwards v. Davis, 6 N. J. L. 391 (1797) ; Robinson v. L'Engle, 13 Fla.
482 (187o); Kingman v. Draper, 14 Ill. App. 577 (1884) ; Groetzinger v.
Latimer, 146 Pa. 628 (1892); Jenkins v. Rush Brook C. Co., 205 Pa. 166
(Igo3) ; Williams P. C. Co. v. Kinsey Co. 205 Fed.'375 (1913).
Stow v. Yarwood, 14 Ill. 424 (1853); Ward v. Fellers, 3 Mich. 281
(1854); Grand Lodge v. Knox, 20 Mo. 433 (I855); Davenport v. Hubbard,
46 Vt. 200 (1873) ; Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 Ill. 280 (1887) ; Babbitt v. Moore,
51 N. J. L. 229 (1889); Grisham v. Bodman, inI Ala. 194 (895); Jarrett
L. Co. v. Reese, 66 Fla. 317 (1913) ; Bennett v. Kupfee Co., 213 Mass. 218
(1913); Houghton v. Alpha P. Co., 93 Atl. 669 (Del. 1915).
"'Act of April iI, 1849, Laws of N. Y., Chap. 438, p. 613.
Act of April T6, 1852, Laws of N. Y., Chap. 392, pp. 654, 149, 150.
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and like most intruders was coldly received. It is described as
"this unfortunate compound which has been pressed, by our
modern Solons, into the service of the fourth and it is to be hoped
the last edition of the code," "this superfluous interpolation which
is not found in our best dictionaries and has been hitherto un-
known to our statutes." 9' Another court doubts "whether a more
perplexing, undefinable, impracticable combination of words
could have been joined together in the English language than
those selected in this particular by the modem reformers, who
claim to stand as sponsors to the present code." 96  With all due
allowance for the natural irritation of a bench compelled to
change the habits of a lifetime, it must be admitted that the word
was well suited to convey the meaning of the codifiers, and that
if a departure from tradition was intended, as was unquestionably
the case, it was better to adopt a new terminology than to attempt
the hopeless task of redefining phases already restricted by a net-
work of precedents. The "unfortunate compound" not found
in the -'best dictionaries" has, like many an upstart, worked its
way into good society, has traveled far, and has been well re-
ceived abroad.
As originally defined, the counter-claim must be one exist-
ing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom
a several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of
one of the following causes of action: ( i ) a cause of action aris-
ing out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint
as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the
subject of the action; (2) in an action on contract, any other
cause of action arising also on contract, and existing at the com-
mencement of the action. 7 Although there are local variations
this is substantially the counter-claim of the American code state.
"Roscoe v. Maison, 7 How. Pr. 121 (N. Y. 1852).
Silliman v. Eddy, 8 How. Pr. 122 (N. Y. 1853).
"New York Code of Procedure, Sec. 15o. The corresponding section
of the present code of civil procedure, which modifies somewhat the original
text, is 5oi. For the variations in the different state statutes see Pomeroy's
Remedies (3d Ed.), Sec. 583.
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To treat even superficially the great host of cases devoted to
the interpretation of these apparently simple clauses would un-
duly prolong this discussion."' This much is pertinent. The
counter-claim described in the second subdivision corresponds to
the prior statutory set-off, but is more comprehensive, including,
by the weight of authority, unliquidated demands 99 as well as cer-
tain claims for equitable relief. That described in the first sub-
division is much broader than the old recoupment;100 affirmative
relief is given where the defendant's damages exceed those of the
plaintiff. Moreover, a cause of 'action in either tort or contract
may be offered as a counter-claim in either tort or contract pro-
vided both causes of action arise out of the same transaction.
101
But the practice is highly technical, depending frequently upon
close questions as to the meaning of the terms "transaction;"
"cause of action," and "subject of action," a labyrinth into which
only the venturesome would intrude. 102 The tort cases, where on
the one hand, it is sought to prove a connection between the seem-
ingly independent acts and, on the other hand, to disprove a con-
nection between acts clearly consequent upon one another, are in
many respects conflicting and offer in themselves a special field
for investigation. 0 3 A doctrine also obtains, fortified in some
instances by statute, that the cause of action in the counter-claim
must be such as will inevitably tend to defeat or diminish the
'See generally Bliss on Code Pleading (3d Ed.), Chap. 18; Pomeroy's
Remedies (3d Ed.), Sec. 726; 25 Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 568;
34 Cyc. 618.
Stockton v. Graves, io Ind. 294 (1858) ; Stoddard v. Treadwell, 26 Cal.
294 (1864); Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447 (N. Y. 1861); McAdow v.
Ross, 53 Mo. '99 (1873) ; Clement v. Field, 147 U. S. 467 (1893) ; Wollan v.
McKay, 24 Ida. 69i (1913) ; Hicksville R. Co. v. Hardy, 48 Barb. 355 (N. Y.
1867).
"®Vail v. Jones, 31 Ind. 467 (1869); Sigler v. Hidy, 56 Ia. 504 (i88I);
Cornelius v. Kessel, 58 Wis. 237 (1883) ; Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N. C. i2o
(1885) ; Duffy v. England, 96 N. E. 704 (Ind. i9I). But see Jones v. Moore,
42 Mo. 413 (i868), and Fulton v. Fisher, 239 Mo. 176 (igII).
... Leavenworth v. Packer, 52 Barb. 132 (N. Y. 1867); Hay v. .Short,
49 Mo. 139 (I87); Bloom v. Lehman, 21 Ark. 489 (1872) ; Stanley v. North-
western M. L. Co., 95 Ind. 254 (1883).
"0 Campbell v. Fox, ii Ia. 318 (i86o) ; Pierce v. Tiersch, 4o Ohio St. 168
(z883)'; Thompson v. Sanders, ii8 N. Y. 252 (I8o0).
" Compare Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320 (N. Y. 1861); Ward v.
Blackwood, 48 Ark. 396 (T886); Rothschild v. Whitman, 132 N. Y. 472
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plaintiff's claim; that is, the two demands must be antagonistic
and tend to destroy each other.10 4  The defendant, therefore,
cannot set up in an action any and every cause of action he may
have against the plaintiff, but can only plead such a cause of
action as constitutes a valid statutory counter-claim. 10 5 In some
of the states the term although used in the practice acts is not
defined, as it is in the codes, and its scope has been left to judicial
determination.' Upon this subject it has been laid down in
Connecticut:
"A defendant by a counter-claim under the statute, cannot
bring in for adjudication any matter that is not so connected with
the matter in controversy under the original complaint that its
consideration by the court is necessary for a full determination of
the rights of the parties as to such matter in controversy, or, if it
is of a Wholly independent character, is a claim upon the plaintiff by
way of set off, and not a claim against a co-defendant." 107
In England, technical set-off remains confined within the
limits set by the Acts of 2 Geo. II, for those acts have not been
repealed; but, under the reformed procedure, counter-claim has
developed beyond the point attained in American practice. The
Judicature Act of 1873 conferred upon the High Court very wide
powers in granting relief to defendants, s08 and, under the rules of
(1892); Braithwaite v. Akin, 3 N. Dak. 365 (1893); Watts v. Gantt, 42 Neb.
869 (1894) ; Block v. Swago, io Ind. App. 6oo (1894); Glide v. Kayser, i42
Cal. 419 (i9o4); Wrege v. Jones, 13 N. Dak. 267 (i9o4); Roberts v. Jones,
71 S. Car. 4o4 (i9o4) ; Smith v. Alvord, 31 Utah 346 (i906), with Stone v.
Stone, 2 Metc. 330 (Kv. 1859): McArthur v. Green Bay Co., 14 Wis. 139
('874); Pacific Express Co. v. Malin, 132 U. S. 53i (1889); Gilbert v.
Soberg, 86 Wis. 661 (I894); Cincinnati Tribune v. Bruck, 6I Ohio St. 489
(i899) ; Degan v. Weeks, 67 N. Y. App. Div. 410 (igoi) ; Gutzman v. Clancy,
114 Wis. 589 (902).
" N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 5oi; Nat. F. Ins. Co. v. McKay, 21 N. Y.
19i (I86O); Lipman v. Jackson A. Co., 128 N. Y. 58 (i89i); Hinckle v.
Margerum, 50 Ind. 24o (875); Babcock v. Maxwell, 21 Mont. 507 (I898);
Scognamillo v. Passarelli, 157 App. Div. 428 (N. Y. 1913); Sydney v. Mug-
ford P. Co., 214 Fed. 841 (Conn. 1914).
Byerly v. Humphry, 95 N. C. 151 (i886).
SConnecticut Practice Act, Gen. Stat. Conn. (i902), Sec. 612; New
Jersey Practice Act of I912, Sec. i2; Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915,
P. L. 483, Sec. i4.
'"Harral v. Leverty, 5o Conn. 46 (1882); Downing v. Wilcox, 84 Conn.
437 (i91I).
'Judicature Act of 1873 (36 and 37 Vict., Chap. 66), Sec. 24, cl. 3.
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the court,109 the defendant may set up by way of counter-claim
"any right or claim whether such set-off or counter-claim sound
in damages or not, and such set-off or counter-claim shall have
the same effect as a cross-action, so as to enable the court to
pronounce a final judgment in the same action, both on the orig-
inal and on the cross-claim." But if in the opinion of the court
such counter-claim cannot be conveniently disposed of in the
pending action, or ought not to be allowed, permission to present
it may be refused. Where the counter-claim raises a question
between the plaintiff, the defendanit and third persons, relating
to the original subject of the cause, the latter may be added as
parties."' If the plaintiff's action is stayed, discontinued or dis-
missed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with.
And if the counter-claim is established, the court may adjudge
to the defendant such relief as he may be entitled to on the
merits."' It will be seen that this procedure encourages, al-
though it does not compel, the settlement in- one law suit of all
outstanding controversies between the litigants. The counter-
claim is practically a cross-action. It-need not be in any way
connected with the plaintiff's claim, or arise out of the same trans-
action; it need not be a claim of the same nature as the original
action or even analogous to it. A claim founded on tort may be
opposed to one founded on contract or vice versa. Even a cause
of action which has accrued to the defendant after the date of the
writ can be pleaded as a counter-claim. 1 2 "This court has deter-
mined," said Lord Esher, "that, where there is a counter-claim,
in settling the rights of the parties, the claim and counter-claim
are, for all purposes except execution, two independent actions."
And Lord Justice Kay added: "All that those acts have done in
"' Order 1g, rule 3; order 21, rules IO to 17.
"Edge v. Weigel, 91 Law Times 447 (19o7); In re a Debtor, 23 Times
R. 169 (19o7); Times C. S. Co. v. Lowther (1910), 2 K. B. Ioo.
"This may lead to a judgment for plaintiff with costs and a separate
judgment for defendant with costs. Provincial B. P. Co. v. Low Moor I.
Co. (199o), 2 K. B. 344; Sharpe v. Haggith, io6 Law Times 13 (1912). But
in the case of a pure set-off judgment is entered for the balance alone.
IBeddall v. Maitland (188i), 17 Ch. D. 174; Piercy v. Young (i88o),
IS Ch. D. 475; Renton v. Neville (1900), 2 Y. B. 181; Re General Railway
Syndicate (19oo), i Ch. D. 365. The Cheapside (19o4), Probate D. 339;
Collison v. Warren (19Ol), I Ch. D. S12. And see general note in Annual
Practice (1914), 366 et seq.
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respect of a counter-claim is to allow a cross-action to be brought
and tried at the same time as the original .action. This is for the
general convenience and to prevent the necessity for trying the
actions separately, with all the attendant cost of doing so." 11
Thus, in the course of something more than two hundred
years, the policy of the law as to cross-demands has undergone a
radical change. The theory that every controversy can by the
mechanical processes of formal logic be reduced to a single ques-
tion of law or fact has fallen into discredit with the scholastic
learning that gave it sustenance in the law courts. Life is too
complicated, time too precious to the modern man to permit him
forever tamely to submit to the dissection of his disputes into a
series of modified ordeals. Irritation at the obvious injustice of
excluding set-offs against plaintiffs of doubtful financial ability;
the waste of time and unnecessary expenditures involved in two
or more suits were all factors in bringing about the eighteenth
century changes. The reforms of the nineteenth century were
accomplished by men who, strongly impressed with the superior-
ity of equity over common law procedure, worked out this prob-
lem through the medium of the cross-bill. In England the prac-
tice of settling all controversies between the parties in a single
action has been carried farther than in the United States and for
good reasons; the huge congestion of business, commercial and
legal, in the centre of a world empire called for the strictest
economy of time and efficiency of methods in procedure. This
in a measure has been accomplished by abandoning common law
pleading, placing the preparation of the cause for trial under the
supervision of a master, limiting the right of trial by jury and
empowering the court to order different questions of fact to be
tried by different modes of trial or that one or more questions of
fact be tried before the others." 4 A system like this lends itself
easily to the disposal of incongruous counter-claims." 5
"3 Stumore v. Campbell (1892), I Q. B. 314.
U See rules of Supreme Court, order 36, rule 8. See also "Studies in
English Procedure," by Samuel Rosenbaum, Esq., 63 UNIv. oF PENNA. L. Rav.
273.
11 In Lord Kinnaird v. Field (i9o5), 2 Ch. D. 36z, the plaintiffs brought
an action in the Chancery Division of the High Court for specific perform-
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Such revolutionary short cuts to speedy justice are clearly
impracticable, if not impossible, in the United States, as long as
the unlimited right of trial by jury in civil actions, as standardized
in the eighteenth century, is jealously guarded by state and fed-
eral constitutions, by judicial decisions, and public approbation.
This is the stone wall against which law reform beats its head in
vain, and will continue to do so until the weakness as well as the
strength of this venerable institution is better understood by the
lay community. The avoidance of circuity of action, of multi-
plicity of suits, of waste of public and private time, is a pro-
gramme to which all -would heartily subscribe in principle, but
the application of a principle to practice is a slower matter; old
prejudices must be overcome, old habits outgrown, new condi-
tions realized. In fact, when this subject comes to be studied
centuries from now, as we study Roman law, it may be decided
that we moved with appreciable rapidity in the development of a
doctrine repugnant to the fundamental ideas of primitive
procedure.
William H. Loyd.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
ance of a contract for an injunction and damages. The defendant counter-
claimed for libel, arrears of salary, specific performance and other matters
and then applied for a transfer of the case to the King's Bench Division for
a jury trial. This was refused but the court said that if the defendant
severed the issues and asked that the issues relating to defamation alone
should be tried before a jury they would accede to the application. The
defendant, however, did not apply.
